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Constrained Bimatrix Games in Wireless
Communications
Koorosh Firouzbakht, Guevara Noubir, Masoud Salehi
Abstract—We develop a constrained bimatrix game framework
that can be used to model many practical problems in many
disciplines, including jamming in packetized wireless networks.
In contrast to the widely used zero-sum framework, in bimatrix
games it is no longer required that the sum of the players’ utilities
to be zero or constant, thus, can be used to model a much
larger class of jamming problems. Additionally, in contrast to
the standard bimatrix games, in constrained bimatrix games the
players’ strategies must satisfy some linear constraint/inequality,
consequently, not all strategies are feasible and the existence
of the Nash equilibrium (NE) is not guaranteed anymore. We
provide the necessary and sufficient conditions under which
the existence of the Nash equilibrium is guaranteed, and show
that the equilibrium pairs and the Nash equilibrium solution of
the constrained game corresponds to the global maximum of a
quadratic program. Finally, we use our game theoretic frame-
work to find the optimal transmission and jamming strategies
for a typical wireless link under power limited jamming.
Index Terms—Wireless communications, jamming, adaptation,
game theory, constrained games.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE convenience of wireless mobile communication hasrevolutionized the way we access information services
and interact with the physical world. Beyond enabling mobile
devices to access information and data services ubiquitously,
wireless technology is widely used in cyber-physical sys-
tems such as air-traffic control, power plants synchronization,
transportation systems, navigation systems and human body
implantable devices. This pervasiveness has elevated wireless
communication systems to the level of critical infrastructure.
Nevertheless, security issues of wireless communications re-
main a serious concern.
Physical layer in wireless networks is a broadcast medium
that is subjected to adversaries. Among the many security
threats that the wireless networks are subject to, jamming at
the physical layer is one of the most prominent and challenging
threats. Physical layer jamming not only can lead to service
interruption/degradation or denial of service, but it is often a
prelude to other upper layer attacks such as spoofing, man in
the middle and downgrade attacks [1], [2], [3], [4], [5].
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Furthermore, many modern wireless networks such as sen-
sor, ad-hoc and mesh networks often operate in a decentral-
ized, self-configurable fashion. Network nodes are governed
by a distributed protocol which allows the nodes to choose an
action, i.e., make a decision, from a set of available actions
based on their evaluation of the network conditions (possibly
relying on the information provided by the other nodes). These
decisions not only have impact on the performance of individ-
ual nodes but may have impact on the overall performance of
the entire network. Nodes may seek the greater good of the
network that is, they seek actions that optimize the overall
performance of the entire network, or they can act selfishly
and compete with other nodes to optimize their individual
performance. Additionally, nodes may act maliciously, i.e,
seek actions that result in performance degradation of the
individual nodes or the entire network.
All these examples have many of the characteristics that
would lead to a natural game theoretic formulation as these
problems cannot be completely modeled by the traditional op-
timization tools. Moreover, as software defined radios (SDRs)
and Cognitive Radios (CRs) become more capable of im-
plementing more sophisticated and complicated adaptation
algorithms, the assumptions of game theoretic models become
an even better match for future wireless networks.
Game theory has been used to solve problems in numerous
aspects of wired and wireless communication systems —
from security at the physical and MAC layer (e.g., jamming
and eavesdropping) to routing and intrusion detection systems
(e.g., collaborative IDS’s) at upper layers of the protocol stack.
[6] and the references therein provide a structured and compre-
hensive overview of the game-theoretic approach to security
and privacy in computer and communications networks. In [7],
the authors use a layered approach to survey applications of
game theory in wireless networking and game models that are
most suitable for each problem.
Reference [8] presents a classification of applications of
game theory in network security based on the game model
that is used to approach the problem. The survey covers both
cooperative and non-cooperative games (see Table I in [8]). In
what follows, we briefly review some of the applications of
game theory in wireless communications. We limit our focus to
the physical layer applications, for applications of game theory
in other network layers we refer the reader to [6] and [7].
1) Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA): addresses the issue of
how to allocate the limited available spectrum among multiple
wireless devices. This problem has two important aspects,
spectrum usage efficiency and fairness to wireless users and
can be modeled as a cooperative or non-cooperative game.
Cooperative models such as bargaining games and coalition
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games are often used where cooperation between spectrum
users can result in an equilibrium that is more efficient and
fair [9], [10].
On the other hand, when collaboration between network
nodes is not possible or permitted for instance, when sec-
ondary users compete for channel or spectrum access in
cognitive radio networks, non-cooperative frameworks (e.g.
auction-based games) are used to model this problem [11].
In cognitive radio networks, the wireless spectrum is shared
between primary users (users that are licensed to operate in
that spectrum band) and secondary users (unlicensed users)
where the secondary users access the spectrum in an oppor-
tunistic manner. In this scenario, the secondary users compete
with each other to access the bandwidth offered by the primary
users and therefore; spectrum sharing in better modeled under
the non-cooperative framework [12], [13].
2) Power control in CDMA networks: is another example
that has been studied by game theoretic approaches [14], [15],
[16]. In CDMA power control problem, a player’s utility
function is usually defined such that it increases with the
signal to interference plus noise ratio (SINR) but decreases
with transmission power [17]. This assumption is well justified
since an increase in the SINR results in lower error probability
and hence would increase the quality of service. Assuming all
network nodes operate at fixed transmission power, an increase
in a node’s transmission power, results in higher SINR for that
node. However, increasing transmission power results in lower
SINR for other users. Because most wireless nodes are battery-
operated, energy management is an important consideration
and if a node’s power is too high, not only it reduces other
nodes’ SINR but it also wastes valuable battery life.
3) Power control in OFDMA networks: Game theory has
also been used to study power control in Orthogonal Frequency
Devision Multiple Access (OFDMA) networks. In OFDMA
networks, the objective is to minimize the overall transmission
power under rate and power constraints by allocating users’
rates and powers to the available sub-channels.
This problem has been studied in the literature in non-
cooperative [18], [19] and cooperative frameworks [20]. In
non-cooperative framework network nodes use local and self-
ish power control strategies to maximize their individual per-
formances while in the cooperative framework, network nodes
use distributed and (possibly) selfless power control strategies
to optimize the overall performance and fairness of the system.
It has been shown that game theoretic power control strategies
can achieve significant individual and/or overall performance
improvements over traditional power control algorithms [14].
4) The jamming problem: among the many security threats
that the wireless networks are subject to, jamming at the
physical layer is one of the most prominent and challenging
threats. Jamming at the physical layer is often modeled as a
zero-sum game, a special class of non-cooperative games [21],
[22], [23], [24], [25]. In a zero-sum game, for all strategy
profiles the sum of players’ payoffs is zero and as a result, if
a player gains a payoff, that payoff must have been lost by
other player(s). Jamming in wireless communication is one
such case as the players, the communicating nodes and the
jammer, have completely conflicting goals.
  
constrained bimatrix games
(quadratic program)
constrained
zero-sum
games
standard 
bimatrix 
games
standard
zero-sum
games (linear program)
Fig. 1. Classification of standard and constrained games.
In zero-sum game framework, it is usually assumed that
the players have perfect knowledge of the game and the
actions that are available to the other players, and they use
this knowledge to compute their respective optimal strategies.
In such a case, the zero-sum framework fully captures the
conflicting goals of the players. Moreover, the equilibrium
solution of the zero-sum game guarantees a minimum payoff
regardless of the other player’s strategy [26].
However, in some jamming scenarios, having perfect knowl-
edge of the system parameters (or available actions) may not
be a feasible option or too costly for a player. In addition,
players may have objectives that are not exactly the opposite of
each other, for example, the transmitter may wish to minimize
the average error probability while the jammer wishes to
minimize the average throughput of the system (as opposed
to maximizing the average error probability).
In such scenarios, a more appropriate framework to model
the communication system under jamming would be a bimatrix
game instead of a zero-sum game1. In bimatrix games it is no
longer required that the sum of the players’ payoffs to be
zero (or a constant value) [26]. As a result, players can have
different objectives and the respective payoffs can be defined
based on the players’ goals and their knowledge of the game
(which in general may be imperfect). Such a formulation,
encompasses a variety of situations from full competition to
full cooperation.
Additionally, in standard zero-sum and bimatrix games there
are no additional restrictions on players’ mixed-strategies, i.e.,
players may choose any probability distribution over their
respective action sets (pure-strategies). However, there exist
scenarios where, due to practical reasons, not all mixed-
strategies are permitted and/or feasible.
Such scenarios demand for a more general framework to
study them. In this paper, we study a constrained bimatrix
game to overcome these limitations. In constrained games, the
players’ mixed-strategies not only have to be a probability dis-
tributions but they must satisfy some additional constraints too
(Figure 1 shows the classification of standard and constrained
games). We study the necessary and sufficient conditions under
which the existence of the Nash equilibrium is guaranteed as
well as a systematic approach to find the NE.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows, in Section II
we will introduce the constrained bimatrix framework and
provide the necessary and sufficient conditions under which
the existence of a constrained NE solution is guaranteed. In
1It can be shown that zero-sum games ate special cases of the more general
bimatrix games.
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Section III we show that the solution of the this constrained
game corresponds to the global maximizers of a quadratic
program. In Section IV we will use the framework that we
developed to study a typical jamming problem. Finally, we
conclude the paper in Section V.
II. CONSTRAINED BIMATRIX GAMES
We start by introducing the concept of the Nash equilibrium
(NE) for standard bimatrix games. Then, we generalize the
standard bimatrix framework by adding linear constraints on
the players strategies and formulate the constraint bimatrix
framework. We refer the reader to [27] and the references
therein for an introduction to some of the most fundamental
concepts of non-cooperative game theory. This tutorial is
specifically written for wireless network engineers and uses
intuitive examples that are focused on wireless networks. [28]
provides a more comprehensive review of non-cooperative
game theory and its applications in wireless communications
and networking. Throughout the rest of the paper, we refer to
player one (row player) as the transmitter and refer to player
two (column player) as the jammer. Nevertheless, applications
of our framework is not limited to jamming in wireless
communications.
Consider a bimatrix game where transmitter’s action set (for
instance, transmission rates) is given by
R = {r1, r2, · · · , rm} ri ∈ R+, 1 ≤ i ≤ m (1)
Without loss of generality assume R is a sorted set, i.e., 0 ≤
r1 < · · · < ri−1 < ri < · · · < rm. Transmitter’s vector of
possible actions (simply, action vector) is the column vector
r defined as
rT = [r1 r2 · · · ri · · · rm]1×m (2)
where T indicates matrix transposition. Similarly, we define
the jammer’s action set and action vector as
J = {j1, j2, · · · , jn} jk ∈ R+, 1 ≤ k ≤ n (3)
and
jT = [j1 j2 · · · jk · · · jn]1×n (4)
where WLOG we assume, 0 ≤ j1 < · · · < jk−1 < jk <
· · · < jn. A standard bimatrix game (also known as two-player
general sum game) is defined by a pair of m× n matrices A
and B such that, if player one plays row i and player two plays
column k, the elements at row i and column k of the matrices
A and B (i.e., aik and bik) would be the payoffs received by
players one and two, respectively.
If we let the players randomize their actions (i.e., allow
them to use mixed-strategies2), the expected payoffs of the
game for the mixed strategy profile (x,y) are
A
(
x,y
)
, xTA y for player I
B
(
x,y
)
, xTB y for player II (5)
where x ∈ Xm , {x ∈ Rm+ ∣∣∑mi=1 xi = 1} and y ∈
Yn ,
{
y ∈ Rn+
∣∣∑n
k=1 yk = 1
}
are mixed-strategy vectors
2A player is playing a mixed-strategy if he randomizes his actions over his
action set according to a probability distribution.
of players one and two, respectively. Player one’s goal is to
find an optimal strategy, x, that maximize his expected payoff
(given by payoff matrix A) against player two’s strategy, y,
i.e., player one wants to solve the following problem
maximize
x∈Xm
A
(
x,y
)
for all y ∈ Yn (6)
while player two’s goal is to maximize his own payoff (given
by payoff matrix B) by solving the following problem
maximize
y∈Yn
B
(
x,y
)
for all x ∈ Xm (7)
The strategy profile
(
x∗,y∗
)
is said to be an equilibrium pair
(or equivalently the Nash equilibrium, NE) if (x∗,y∗) satisfies
(6) and (7) simultaneously. That is, x∗ maximizes (6) for y∗
and y∗ maximizes (7) for x∗, and therefore, no player benefits
by unilaterally changing his strategy.
Theorem 1. Every finite bimatrix game in its standard form
has at least one equilibrium pair (Nash equilibrium) in mixed-
strategies.
Proof: See Theorem 1 in [29].
Consider a bimatrix game for which, due to practical rea-
sons, not all mixed-strategies are permitted and/or are feasible.
For instance, assume maximizing the average throughput of
a wireless link. Maximizing the average throughput requires
using higher transmission rates; but to maintain an acceptable
error rate at the receiver, higher rates must be transmitted
at higher transmission power. Because of battery limitation
(internal limitation) or the FCC regulations (external limi-
tations), the transmitter must keep its average transmission
power below a certain value. Consequently, the wireless user
cannot use certain actions that are more preferable to him (such
as transmitting at the highest rate all the time). He may only
choose actions that result in an average transmission power
less than or equal to a predetermined value.
Assume the mixed-strategy pair x and y must be chosen
from some hyperpolyhedron defined by linear inequalities,
x ∈ X̂ , {x ∈ Xm ∣∣ rTx ≤ rave} (8)
and
y ∈ Ŷ , {y ∈ Yn ∣∣ jTy ≤ jave} (9)
we denote this constraint game by G = (A,B, r, j, rave, jave)
where A,B ∈ Rm×n are the payoff matrices for player one
and two, respectively, and weight vectors r and j are given
by (2) and (4), respectively3. It is easily verified that for
rave ≥ max ri and jave ≥ max jk the constrained game
simplifies to the bimatrix game in its standard form; hence,
the unconstrained game can be viewed as a special case of the
constrained games (see Figure 1). Therefore, in the following
we assume that at least one of the following inequalities holds
rave < max ri or jave < max jk (10)
By introducing (8) and (9), and assuming that (10) holds,
we are eliminating some mixed-strategies that could have been
otherwise selected. Therefore, the existence of the NE solution
3This is different from the bimatrix game in its standard form where the
payoff matrices A and B completely define the game.
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TABLE I
NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR A PAIR (x∗,y∗) TO BE THE NE.
Player I Player II
1Tx∗ − 1 = 0 (I.1) 1Ty∗ − 1 = 0 (II.1)
rTx∗ − rave ≤ 0 (I.2) jTy∗ − jave ≤ 0 (II.2)
−x∗ ≤ 0 (I.3) −y∗ ≤ 0 (II.3)
Ay∗ − urm×1 − α1m×1 ≤ 0 (I.4) x∗TB − vJn×1 − β1n×1 ≤ 0 (II.4)
x∗TA y∗ − urave − α = 0 (I.5) x∗TB y∗ − vjave − β = 0 (II.5)
u
(
rTx∗ − rave
)
= 0 (I.6) v
(
jTy∗ − jave
)
= 0 (II.6)
u ≥ 0, α ∈ R (I.7) v ≥ 0, β ∈ R (II.7)
for this constrained bimatrix game is not trivial and must be
established (see Appendix).
Assuming that in the constrained bimatrix game G = (A,B,
r, j, rave, jave
)
, the jammer is playing his optimal strategy y∗.
Transmitter’s optimal strategy, x∗, against y∗ is the maximizer
of the following problem
maximize
x
xTA y∗ s.t.
 1
Tx− 1 = 0
rTx− rave ≤ 0
−x ≤ 0
(11)
Similarly, jammer’s optimal strategy, y∗, against x∗ is the
maximizer of the following problem
maximize
y
x∗TB y s.t.
 1
Ty − 1 = 0
jTy − jave ≤ 0
−y ≤ 0
(12)
Individually, (11) and (12) are linear programs, but x∗ and
y∗ are not known in advance or in general they may not even
exist. Theorem 2 gives the necessary and sufficient conditions
that any Nash equilibrium solution of G must satisfy. That
is, every NE solution of G satisfies the conditions in Table I
and every strategy pair (x,y) that satisfies the conditions in
Table I must be a NE. Additionally, in the Appendix, we
prove the conditions under which existence of the NE for this
constrained bimatrix game is guaranteed.
Theorem 2. Let G = (A,B, r, j, rave, jave) be a constrained
bimatrix game defined by matrices A,B ∈ Rm×n. A strategy
pair (x∗,y∗) is an equilibrium pair (NE), if and only if there
exists scalers u, v ≥ 0 and α, β ∈ R such that the conditions
in Table I are satisfied.
Proof: Consider the KKT conditions for the linear pro-
gram (11). The optimal solution x∗ must satisfy the primal
feasibility conditions given by 1
Tx∗ − 1 = 0
rTx∗ − rave ≤ 0
−x∗ ≤ 0
(13)
which are identical to conditions (I.1) – (I.3) in Table I. From
the dual feasibility conditions we must have
∇
(
x∗TA y∗
)
−
m∑
i=1
λi∇(−x∗i )
− u∇(rTx∗ − rave)
− µ∇(1Tx∗ − 1) = 0
(14)
such that
λi ≥ 0, u ≥ 0, µ ∈ R (15)
where λi, u and µ are the KKT multipliers corresponding
to constraints in (11). If we simplify (14) and use vector
representations for KKT multipliers we get
Ay∗ + λm×1 − ur− µ1m×1 = 0 (16)
or, equivalently,
Ay∗ − ur− µ1m×1 ≤ 0 u ≥ 0 and µ ∈ R (17)
which gives us condition (I.4) in Table I (where we have
made a change of variable, µ → α, and have used the fact
that λm×1 ≥ 0). Finally, from the complementary slackness
conditions we must have{
λTx∗ = 0
u
(
rTx∗ − rave
)
= 0
(18)
the second condition in (18) is identical to (I-6). By multiply-
ing (16) by x∗T and using λTx∗ = 0 we have
x∗TA y∗ + x∗Tλ− ux∗T r− µx∗T1 = 0 (19)
which can be further simplified to
x∗TA y∗ − urave − µ = 0 u ≥ 0 and µ ∈ R (20)
which results in condition (I.5) in Table I. In the exact same
way, we can derive KKT’s necessary conditions of optimality
for the jammer to get the conditions (II.1) – (II.7) in Table I.
To prove that these conditions are also sufficient, we can use
the fact that the objective functions in (11) and (12) are linear
(affine), and as a result, the KKT conditions are necessary and
sufficient for optimality; this concludes the proof.
Table I summarizes the necessary and sufficient conditions
of optimality for the constrained bimatrix game. Furthermore,
the following lemma, gives the expected payoff of the players
at the Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 1. Consider the constrained bimatrix game G =(
A,B, r, j, rave, jave
)
. The expected payoffs of the game for
the equilibrium pair (x∗,y∗) are
A
(
x∗,y∗
)
= urave + α (21)
B
(
x∗,y∗
)
= vjave + β (22)
for the transmitter and jammer, respectively.
Proof: Follows from conditions (I.5) and (II.5) in Table I.
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III. CONNECTION TO QUADRATIC PROGRAMING
While Theorem 2 gives the necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for the strategy profile (x∗,y∗) to be a NE of G, it
does not provide a constructive way to find the NE solution(s)
and the equilibrium pairs of the constrained bimatrix game.
We have previously shown [25] that for every constrained
two-player zero-sum game there exists an equivalent linear
program whose solution yields a NE for the game and every
NE of the game is a solution of the corresponding linear
program.
In this section, we show that there exist a similar con-
nection between the NE solutions and equilibrium pairs of
the constrained bimatrix games and global maximum(s) of a
quadratic program4. In the following theorem, we show that
the global maximum of the quadratic program in (23) subject
to the constraints in (24) satisfies all conditions of Theorem 2
and therefore, the corresponding maximizer is a NE solution
of G.
Theorem 3. Let G = (A,B,x,y, rave, jave) be a constrained
bimatrix game with A,B ∈ Rm×n. The strategy pair (x∗,y∗)
is a Nash equilibrium of G if and only if there exist scalers
u∗, v∗ ≥ 0 and α∗, β∗ ∈ R such that (x∗,y∗, u∗, v∗, α∗, β∗)
is a global maximizer of the following quadratic program
maximize
x,y,u,v,α,β
xT
(
A+B
)
y − urave − vjave − α− β (23)
subject to:
Ay − urm×1 − α1m×1 ≤ 0 (24.1)
xTB − vjn×1 − β1n×1 ≤ 0 (24.2)
rTx− rave ≤ 0 (24.3)
jTy − jave ≤ 0 (24.4)
1Tx− 1 = 0 (24.5)
1Ty − 1 = 0 (24.6)
−x,−y ≤ 0, −u,−v ≤ 0 and α, β ∈ R (24.7)
(24)
Proof: First, notice that the constraints in (24) satisfy
all the conditions of Table I except for (I.5), (I.6) and (II.5),
(II.6). As a result, if we show that the global maximum of the
quadratic program in (23) satisfies these additional conditions,
then, by Theorem 2, it must be a NE solution of G. If we
premultiply (24.1) by xT and use (24.3) to simplify the result
we have
xTA y − urave − α ≤ 0 (25)
since xT is a probability vector and u ≥ 0. Similarly, we can
obtain the following inequality from (24.2) and (24.4):
xTB y − vjave − β ≤ 0 (26)
by combining inequalities (25) and (26) we observe that
f
(
x,y, u, v, α, β
)
, xT
(
A+B
)
y−urave−vjave−α−β ≤ 0
Thus, any set of variables
(
x∗,y∗, u∗, v∗, α∗, β∗
)
that satisfies
f
(
x∗,y∗, u∗, v∗, α∗, β∗
)
= 0 (27)
4The connection between standard bimatrix games and quadratic programs
was first shown in [30].
is a global maximum of (23). Next, we will consider the
KKT necessary conditions for optimality for the optimization
problem in (23). To find the necessary KKT conditions, we
stack the variables in the following vector and we take the
gradients in the same order.
zT ,
[
xT1×m y
T
1×n u v α β
]T
(m+n+4)×1 (28)
From this point forward, we assume all variables are optimal
and for convenience, we drop the ∗ from the variables. Primal
feasibility conditions are identical to the constraints in (24).
The dual feasibility condition necessitates5 that, for the global
maximizer of (27), z, the gradient of f(z) must be a linear
combination of the gradients of the binding constraints in (24),
i.e., we must have
(A+B)y
(A+B)Tx
−rave
−jave
−1
−1
−
m∑
i=1
λi

0
ATi,:
−ri
0
−1
0
−
n∑
k=1
µk

B:,k
0
0
−jk
0
−1
− b1

r
0
0
0
0
0

− b2

0
j
0
0
0
0
− a1

1
0
0
0
0
0
− a2

0
1
0
0
0
0
−
m∑
i=1
φi

ei
0
0
0
0
0
−
n∑
k=1
θk

0
ek
0
0
0
0

− σ1

0
0
−1
0
0
0
− σ2

0
0
0
−1
0
0
 =

0m×1
0n×1
01×1
01×1
01×1
01×1

(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
(29)
where we have taken the gradients of the constraints in the
same order as in (24), and Ai,: and ei denote the i’th row
of A and the i’th basis vector, respectively. Additionally, the
KKT multipliers must satisfy
λi, φi ≥ 0 for i = 1, . . . ,m
µk, θk ≥ 0 for k = 1, . . . , n
b1, b2, σ1, σ2 ≥ 0
a1, a2 ∈ R
(30)
By inspecting parts (v) and (vi) of the systems of vector
equations in (29), we observe that for the KKT multipliers λi
and µk we have
m∑
i=1
λi = 1, λi ≥ 0 and
n∑
k=1
µk = 1, µk ≥ 0 (31)
Now, let
λi = xi for i = 1, . . . ,m
µk = yk for k = 1, . . . , n
a1 = α, a2 = β
(32)
5The KKT conditions are the necessary conditions (not sufficient) since the
objective function in (23) is non-convex.
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and note that, because of the constraints on the KKT mul-
tipliers λi, µk, a1 and a2, we are allowed to make these
assumptions. From parts (iii) and (iv) of (24) we obtain
jTy − jave + σ2 = 0 σ2 ≥ 0
xT r− rave + σ1 = 0 σ1 ≥ 0
(33)
and finally, from parts (i) and (ii) we have
xTB − b2jT − β1T + θT = 0 b2,θ ≥ 0
Ay − b1r− α1 + φ = 0 b1,φ ≥ 0
(34)
By substituting the KKT multipliers with the variables given
in (32) we may write the complementary slackness conditions
for (24) as follows
xTA y − uxT r− α = 0 (35)
xTB y − vjTy − β = 0 (36)
b1r
Tx = b1rave (37)
b2j
Ty = b2jave (38)
and
φTx = θTy = σ1u = σ2v = 0 (39)
Now, if we multiply the first relation in (33) by v and use
(39) to simplify the result we have
v
(
jTy − jave
)
+ vσ2 = 0
⇒ v(jTy − jave) = 0 (40)
which is identical to condition (II.6) in Table I. Similarly, from
the second relation in (33), we can obtain
u
(
xT r− rave
)
= 0 (41)
which gives us condition (I.6) in Table I. Finally, if we post-
multiply (34) by y and use (39) to simplify the result we have
xTB y − b2jTy − β1Ty + θTy = 0
⇒ xTB y − b2jTy − β = 0 (42)
comparing (42) with (36) we notice that b2 = v and by using
(37) we obtain the desired result:
xTB y − vjave − β = 0 (43)
Similarly, we can show that b1 = u and
xTA y − urave − α = 0 (44)
Conditions (43) and (44) are exactly conditions (II.5) and (I.5)
in Table I and as a result, the maximizer of the quadratic
program in (23), subject to constraints in (24), satisfies all the
conditions of Theorem 2 and, hence, is a Nash equilibrium
of G. The last step is to show that the set of variables(
x,y, u, v, α, β
)
is indeed a global maximizer of (23). Adding
(43) to (44) gives us the desired result.
xT
(
A+B
)
y − urave − vjave − α− β = 0 (45)
The converse of theorem states that if (x∗,y∗) is a NE pair,
then,
(
x∗,y∗, u∗, v∗, α∗, β∗
)
is a global maximizer of (23). By
  
AWGN
Transmitted packets Received packets
Jamming signals
Mobile userBase-station
Fig. 2. Packetized AWGN link under power limited jamming.
using Lemma 1 and the necessary and sufficient conditions in
Table I it can be easily verified that
x∗T
(
A+B
)
y∗ − u∗rave − v∗jave − α∗ − β∗ = 0 (46)
and hence the NE solution of the constrained bimatrix game
G = (A,B, r, j, rave, jave) is indeed a global maximum of the
quadratic program defined in (23). This concludes the proof.
IV. A SPECIAL CASE: PACKETIZED AWGN LINK UNDER
POWER LIMITED JAMMING
In this section we use the framework we developed in
the previous sections to study a typical jamming problem
and show that the constrained bimatrix game can be used to
formulate this typical problem.
Consider the wireless communication system shown in
Figure 2. The communication link between a base-station
(transmitter) and a mobile user (receiver) is a single-hop,
packet-switched, AWGN channel with fixed and known noise
variance, N , measured at the receiver’s side. Furthermore,
assume the communication link is being disrupted by an
average power limited additive Gaussian jammer with flat
power spectral density. The impact of the Gaussian jammer
on the communication link is the reduction of the effective
signal to noise ratio (SNR) at the receiver from PT /N to
PT /(N+J), where J represents the jammer power (variance)
and PT is the transmitter power, both measured at the receiver
side.
We assume that the jammer uses a set of discrete jamming
power levels denoted by J . The jammer may use any jamming
power but must maintain an overall average power constraint,
denoted by Jave. The jammer uses his available power levels
according to a probability distribution (his strategy) and his
goal is to cause the maximum damage to the communication
link by destroying as many packets as possible while main-
taining the average power constraint.
The base-station has a rate adaptation block with n differ-
ent but fixed rates. Transmission rates are bounded between
minimum and maximum rates denoted by Rmin and Rmax,
respectively. Without loss of generality, we assume the rates
are sorted in a decreasing order. Hence, the base-station’s
action set, denoted by R, becomes
R = {R0 = Rmax > ·· > Ri > ·· > Rn−1 = Rmin}(nats/trans)
(47)
Assuming Rmax is feasible and packets are long enough that
channel capacity theorem could be applied to each packet, it
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follows from the capacity of the discrete-time AWGN channel
that we must have
PT ≥ Pmin = N
(
e2Rmax − 1) (48)
to make all transmission rates viable. Throughout the rest of
this section, we assume that the base-station transmits data
packets at a fixed and known power, PT , where PT ≥ Pmin.
The base-station uses the available rates according to a prob-
ability distribution (his strategy) and his goal is to find an
optimal strategy to maximize the average throughput of the
channel subject to jamming.
Given that the channel noise variance is fixed and known,
corresponding to each transmission rate Rj ∈ R there exists
a certain jammer power, Ĵj ≥ 0, such that if the actual
jamming power used by the jammer is less than Ĵj , then
reliable communication is possible, i.e.,
Rj =
1
2
log
(
1 +
PT
N + Ĵj
)
⇒ Ĵj = PT
e2Rj − 1 −N j = 0, · · · , n− 1
(49)
Assuming that R is publicly available (such as the typical
rates of IEEE 802.11 standard) and PT and N could be
estimated, the jammer can use (49) to construct his action
set, specifically, consider the following action set
J =
{
J0, J1, · · · , Jj , · · · , Jn
}
(50)
where Jj for 0 ≤ j ≤ n is given by
Jj =
{
0 j = 0
Ĵj−1 + δN = PTe2Rj−1−1 + (δ − 1)N j = 1, . . . , n
The jammer adds δN with δ > 0 to his non-zero jamming
powers to make sure that Rj is greater than the channel
capacity corresponding to Jj . Jammer’s mixed-strategy set,
Yn+1Jave , is then the set of all probability vectors that result in
an average power less than or equal to Jave, i.e.,
Yn+1Jave = {y(n+1)×1 ∈ Yn+1
∣∣ yTJ ≤ Jave} (51)
where y(n+1)×1 and J (n+1)×1 are jammer’s mixed-strategy
and jamming power vectors, respectively, and Yn+1 is a
standard (n+ 1)-simplex.
Since destroyed packets do not contribute to the aver-
age throughput of the communication system, the payoff
per transmitted packet, C
(
Ri, Jj
)
, for the pure-strategy pair(
Rj , Jj
) ∈ R × J is equal to the transmission rate of that
packet if the packet is recovered, and zero if it is destroyed,
i.e.,
C
(
Ri, Jj
)
nats/trans. =
{
Ri j < i
0 j ≥ i (Ri, Jj) ∈ R×J (52)
Therefore the payoff matrix corresponding to (52), where
the base-station is the row player, will be an n × (n + 1)
1
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Fig. 3. Average throughout at the NE as a function of Jave.
matrix with zero elements above the main diagonal, i.e.,
C =

R0 0 · · · 0
...
. . .
...
Ri · · · Ri 0 · · · 0
...
. . .
...
Rn−1 · · · Rn−1 0

n×(n+1)
(53)
Let xn×1 and y(n+1)×1 be the base-station’s and jammer’s
mixed-strategies, respectively. Then the base-station’s problem
becomes the following maximization problem
maximize
x∈Xn
xTCy for all y ∈ Yn+1Jave (54)
It can be proved [25] that this problem has closed form
solution and the average throughput at the Nash equilibrium
as a function of Jave is given by
C
(
x∗,y∗
)
=
Jm+1 − Jave
Jm+1 − Jave,mRm Jave,m ≤ Jave < Jave,m+1
(55)
for 1 ≤ m < n− 1 and Jave,m is defined as
Jave,m = Rm
m∑
j=1
(
R−1j −R−1j−1
)
Jj 1 ≤ m ≤ n (56)
Figure 3 shows the average throughput of the communication
link at the NE as a function of jammer’s average power for a
typical case. For this example, we use the range of rates from
the IEEE 802.11 standard, i.e., we assume coded data rates of
the base station are distributed between Rmin = 1 Mbps and
Rmax = 54 Mbps and the channel bandwidth is 22 MHz.
Since jammer’s goal is to maximize the number of destroyed
packets, we define the jammer’s payoff per packet to be 1 if the
packet is destroyed and 0 if the packet is recovered. Thus, the
jammer’s utility function for the pure-strategy pair (Ri, Jj)
becomes
J
(
Ri, Jj
)
=
{
0 j < i
1 j ≥ i (Ri, Jj) ∈ R× J (57)
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and the payoff matrix corresponding to (57) becomes
JT =

0 1 · · · 1
...
. . .
...
0 · · · 0 1 · · · 1
...
. . .
...
0 · · · 0 1

n×(n+1)
(58)
Comparison of the payoff matrices in (53) and (58) clearly
shows base-station’s and jammer’s conflicting goals; while the
base-station’s non-zero payoffs appear on or below the main
diagonal of his payoff matrix (C), jammer’s non-zero payoffs
are above the main diagonal of his respective payoff matrix
(JT ). But in contrast to the zero-sum games, the sum of the
two matrices in (53) and (58) is not zero.
Since the jammer’s utility function is not the negative of
the base-station’s utility function the jammer can play two
different games to cause damage to the performance of the
communication link. The jammer can simply ignore base-
station’s utility function and maximize his average utility
based on his own payoff matrix. This game is equivalent to a
constrained zero-sum game with matrix J given in (58) and
average power constraint Jave where the jammer is the row
player (maximizer).
It can be easily verified that any row in jammer’s payoff
matrix (J) is dominated by the last row which corresponds
to his maximum jamming power (Jn). But because of the
average jamming power constraint, Jave, the jammer cannot
use Jn all the time. As a result the optimal strategy for
the jammer is to use his maximum jamming power with
probability p = Jave/Jn and not jam a packet with proba-
bility (1 − p). Therefore, jammer’s expected payoff (average
destroyed packets) as a function of his average power for the
constrained zero-sum game becomes
J∗zero-sum
(
Jave
)
=
1
Jn
Jave 0 ≤ Jave ≤ Jn (59)
The optimal strategy for this zero-sum game (this strategy is
called the jammer’s maxmin strategy) guarantees the payoff
given in (59) regardless of the base-station’s strategy.
An alternative approach for the jammer is to play the
constrained bimatrix game G = (C, JT , R, Rave, J , Jave),
where R is the base station rate vector. Since in this special
case the base station does not have an average constraint
on its strategies, Rave is an arbitrary number that satisfies
Rave > maxRi. With this assumption, the condition (I.2) in
Table I becomes redundant and from condition (I.5) in Table I
it follows that u = 0, hence, the quadratic program in (23)
simplifies to
maximize
x,y,v,α,β
xT
(
C + JT
)
y − vJave − α− β (60)
subject to 
Cy − α1 ≤ 0
xJT − vJ − β1 ≤ 0
JTy − Jave ≤ 0
1Ty − 1 = 0
1Tx− 1 = 0
x, y, v ≥ 0
(61)
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Fig. 4. Average destroyed packets at the NE as a function of Jave.
and the expected payoff of the jammer at the NE becomes
J∗bimatrix
(
Jave
)
= v∗Jave + β∗ (62)
where v∗ and β∗ are the global maximizers of (60).
It can be shown (see Theorem 4) that for certain values
of Jave, the maximization problem in (60) has a closed form
solution. For these specific values, the expected payoff of the
base station is equal to Rm,m = 0, . . . , n− 1.
Theorem 4. In the constrained bimatrix game G = (C, JT ,
R, Rave, J , Jave) let
Jave = Rm
m∑
i=0
(R−1i −R−1i−1)Ji for m = 0, . . . , n− 1 (63)
then, equilibrium pair solution, (x∗,y∗), and the optimal
mixed-strategies are given by
x∗T = [x0, . . . , xi, . . . xm,0] xi = J−1m (Ji − Ji−1)
y∗T = [y0, . . . , yi, . . . ym,0] yi = Rm(R−1i −R−1i−1)
(64)
for the base station and the jammer respectively (where we
used R−1−1 = J−1 = 0). Furthermore, the expected payoffs of
G at the NE are
x∗TC y∗ = Rm
y∗TJ x∗ = RmJ−1m
m∑
i=0
(R−1i −R−1i−1)Ji
(65)
Proof: It is sufficient to show that there exist v > 0 and
α, β ∈ R for which (60) is zero. Let v = J−1m , α = Rm and
β = 0, then
x∗T
(
C + JT
)
y∗ − J−1m Jave −Rm = 0 (66)
Analytical study and numerical simulations verify that the
expected payoff at the NE for the constrained bimatrix game
strictly outperforms the zero-sum game if the average jamming
power is less than a jamming threshold, JTH. That is, the
expected payoff of the bimatrix game satisfies
J∗bimatrix
(
Jave
)
> J∗zero-sum
(
Jave
)
for all 0 < Jave < JTH (67)
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and
J∗bimatrix
(
Jave
)
= J∗zero-sum
(
Jave
)
for all Jave ≥ JTH (68)
The jamming threshold, JTH, is the minimum average jamming
power required to force a transmitter to operate at his lowest
rate in a single-hop packetized wireless link6. It can be proved
(see [25] Theorem 4) that the minimum average jamming
power that can force the transmitter to use his lowest rate
is given by
JTH = Rn−1
n−1∑
j=1
(
R−1j −R−1j−1
)
Jj (69)
Figure 4 shows a comparison between the expected payoff
of the zero-sum game and the constrained bimatrix game for
a typical case. As expected, the average payoff of the bimatrix
game at the NE strictly dominates the zero-sum game for
Jave < JTH and the expected payoffs converge for Jave ≥ JTH,
i.e., the bimatrix game simplifies to a zero-sum game.
V. CONCLUSION
We developed a constrained bimatrix game framework that
can be used to model many practical jamming problems
in packetized wireless networks. In contrast to the standard
bimatrix games, in constrained bimatrix games the players’
strategies must satisfy some additional average conditions,
consequently, not all strategies are feasible and the existence of
the NE is not guaranteed anymore. We provided the necessary
and sufficient conditions under which the existence of the
Nash equilibrium (NE) is guaranteed and showed that the
equilibrium pairs and the Nash equilibrium solution of this
constrained game corresponds to the global maximum of a
quadratic program. Finally, we studied a typical packetized
wireless link under power limited jamming and showed that
the game theoretic analysis of this typical problem yields
rather surprising results.
APPENDIX
EXISTENCE OF THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM FOR
THE CONSTRAINED BIMATRIX GAME
In game theory, fixed-point theorems are commonly used
to prove that a model has an equilibrium point. In particular,
6Theoretical analysis suggests that for a single-hop packetized commu-
nication link under power limited jamming, such a threshold always exists
[25], [31]. Experimental studies confirm the existence of such a threshold on
jammer’s average power [32].
Brouwer’s fixed point theorem is often used to prove the ex-
istence of a solution for finite games (e.g., see [29]), however,
the approach used in [29] (and similar approaches) cannot
be extended to constrained game. As a consequence of the
average constrains on mixed-strategies, arbitrary probabilities
cannot be assigned to some pure-strategies and as a result, a
more general approach is required. In our approach, we use the
Kakutani’s fixed point theorem to prove that our constrained
bimatrix model has at least one equilibrium point. We start
this section by providing some definitions.
Set-valued function (set-function or correspondence): De-
noted by F : X ⇒ Y is mapping from X to non-empty
subsets of Y , i.e., for all x ∈ X we have F (x) ∈ 2Y − ∅. As
opposed to a single-valued function (or simply, a function), a
set-valued function can map its input to more than one output.
Figure 5 shows a comparison of a single-valued function and
a set-valued function.
Convexed-valued function: Let F : X ⇒ Y be a set-valued
function then F is convex-valued if F (x) is a convex set for
all x ∈ X .
Upper semi-continuous: F is upper semi-continuous if the
following holds: for every sequence xk in X that converges
to some point x ∈ X and for every sequence yk in Y that
converges to y ∈ Y , if yk ∈ F (xk) for all k ∈ N, then
y ∈ F (x).
Fixed point of a set-valued function: Let F : Z ⇒ Z be
a set-valued function then x∗ ∈ Z is a fixed point of F if
x∗ ∈ F (x∗).
The following theorem, known as Kakutani’s fixed point
theorem, provides the sufficient conditions for a set-valued
function defined on a subset of Euclidean space to have a
fixed point.
Theorem 5 ( Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem). Let Z ⊆ Rn be
a nonempty compact and convex set and let F : Z ⇒ Z be
an upper semi-continuous and convex-valued correspondence.
Then F has a fixed point.
Proof: See [33].
Theorem 6. Let G = (A,B, r, j, rave, jave) be a constrained
bimatrix game, then G has a Nash equilibrium solution if
rave ≥ min ri and jave ≥ min jk.
Proof: Let F be a set-valued function defined on (X̂×Ŷ),
F : (X̂× Ŷ)⇒ (X̂× Ŷ) (70)
where X̂ and Ŷ are defined in (8) and (9), respectively.
Obviously, X̂ ⊂ Rm and Ŷ ⊂ Rn are non-empty, closed
and convex subsets. (Note that X̂ and Ŷ are intersections of
standard k-simplices and closed half spaces, furthermore, the
intersections are non-empty since by assumption rave ≥ min ri
and jave ≥ min jk). Therefore, the subspace resulted by the
Cartesian product of X̂ and Ŷ, (X̂×Ŷ), is also a non-empty,
closed and convex subset of Rm+n. Now define F , such that,
F (x,y) = Fx(y)×Fy(x) = {(x¯, y¯)} (x,y) ∈ X̂×Ŷ (71)
where
Fx(y) = {x¯i} , argmax
x∈X̂
xTA y (72)
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and
Fy(x) = {y¯j} , argmax
y∈Ŷ
xTB y (73)
That is, F maps every strategy pair (x,y) ∈ X̂ × Ŷ to the
Cartesian product of the sets {x¯i} and {y¯j} (given by Fx(y)
and Fy(x), respectively) where all x¯i’s are optimal against y
and all y¯j’s are optimal against x.
From (72) and (73) it is clear that for all (x,y) ∈ X̂ × Ŷ
the set valued function Fx(y) depends only on y and Fy(x)
depends only on x. Therefore, if we show that {x¯i} = Fx(y)
is convexed and upper semi-continuous for every y ∈ Ŷ by
extending the exact same argument to {y¯j} = Fy(x) we
can show that F (x,y) is convexed-valued and upper semi-
continuous.
Consider Fx(y) in (72), for any given y ∈ Ŷ the problem in
(72) is a linear program in x. Therefore, the solution is always
at the intersection of some binding constraints, i.e., it is a
polytope at some corner of the feasible region in the direction
of the gradient of Fx (see Figure 6). As a result, the set {x¯i} is
either a singleton in X̂ (when ∇Fx(y) is not normal to some
face of X̂ – Figure 6, top) or a face of X̂ (when ∇Fx(y) is
normal to some face of X̂ – Figure 6, bottom), in either case,
the solution set is convex and compact for all y ∈ Ŷ. By
using the same argument, it is clear that {y¯j} is also convex
and compact for all x ∈ X̂. Therefore, the set-valued function
F (x,y) is also convexed-valued.
It can be shown (by contradiction) that for every sequence
yk in Ŷ that converges to y and for every sequence x¯k that
converges to x¯ such that x¯k ∈ Fx(yk) for all k ∈ N then we
must have x¯ ∈ Fx(y). If Fx was not upper semi-continuous
then x¯ /∈ Fx(y) for some sequence. Assume Fx(y) is a
singleton in X̂ (Figure 6, top), we can find K sufficiently large
to make yK arbitrarily close to y and therefore, for all k > K
we have Fx(yk>K) = Fx(y) = x¯ which is a contradiction.
This argument can be easily extended to the case where Fx(y)
is some face of X̂ (Figure 6, bottom).
Therefore, Fx(y) is upper semi-continuous in X̂ (so is
Fy(x) in Ŷ). Hence, F is an upper semi-continuous function
Therefore, the set-valued function F (x,y) defined in (71)
satisfies the requirements of Kakutani’s theorem and has a
fixed point (x∗,y∗) such that
(x∗,y∗) ∈ F (x∗,y∗) (74)
that is, there exist a strategy pair (x∗,y∗) where its elements
are optimal against each other and by definition, this is an
equilibrium point of G. This concludes the proof.
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